

SECRET

6 OCT 1976

OLC#76-2869

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Office of Legislative Counsel

FROM: [REDACTED]
Special Assistant for Coordination
of Foreign Narcotics Information

SUBJECT: Briefing of Senator Nunn and Staff
Members of the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations

1. Action Required:

This memorandum is primarily for the Director's information. As noted in paragraph 3.c. below, staff and operational elements are initiating necessary action to respond to requests for follow-on information made by Senator Nunn and Subcommittee Staff members.

2. Background:

a. [REDACTED] Special Assistant for Coordination of Foreign Narcotics Information, accompanied by [REDACTED] of the Office of Legislative Counsel, met with Senator Sam Nunn, Acting Chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee and subcommittee staff members in the Senator's office on 5 October 1976 to brief them on CIA's role with regard to international narcotics control and answer any questions they might raise. Accompanying Senator Nunn were Mr. Howard J. Feldman, Chief Counsel; Mr. Stuart M. Statler, Minority Chief Counsel; Mr. Bob Sloan, Minority Special Counsel; Mr. Keith Adkinson, Assistant Counsel; and Mr. Bill Gallinaro, Investigator.

E 2 IMPDET

CL [REDACTED]

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Briefing of Senator Nunn and Staff Members
of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations Page 2

b. Senator Nunn opened the discussion by explaining the Subcommittee's concern over the flow of narcotics into the United States and the possibly related problem of arms trafficking and terrorism. The Senator emphasized his desire to gain the best possible factual appreciation of these problems without in any way impinging adversely on any operational equities of the various Executive Branch agencies or departments with which the Subcommittee might deal.

25X1 c. [] responded that the Agency appreciated the opportunity to meet with the Senator and his staff, and that the Director had instructed us to be as responsive as possible.

25X1 [] then took up the questions that Mr. Adkinson of the Staff had forwarded to the Office of Legislative Counsel (Attachment A). Mr.

25X1 [] referred to and discussed the Agency's appreciation of the interchange of weapons for narcotics (Attachment B). The main thrust of this assessment is that the Agency has no information directly linking revolutionary groups with narcotics trafficking in order to obtain weapons from the United States. This led into a rather lengthy discussion of how the Agency is organized, what kinds of reports it produces (finished and unevaluated intelligence) and the Agency's role with regard to international terrorism. Mr.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SUBJECT: Briefing of Senator Nunn and Staff Members
of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations Page 3

25X1


d. Moving on to the question concerning the Subcommittee's interest in CIA's views with regard to inadequate foreign narcotics intelligence, [] discussed the problems and recommendations outlined in Attachments C and D. The main thrust of this discussion concerned problems stemming from foreign intelligence agencies sharing information with enforcement agencies; the need for DEA to allocate more resources to the overall intelligence process as it relates to narcotics; and legal problems and restrictions related to the legal obligation to protect sources on the part of intelligence agencies whereas enforcement agencies must use information in open court proceedings. [] discussed CIA's recommendation to the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control to review U.S. strategies abroad, particularly its view that U.S. efforts should be aimed at getting foreign governments to undertake the burden of prosecuting or otherwise immobilizing foreign traffickers in their own countries rather than attempting to build cases against them for prosecution in the United States. Such a change in U.S. strategy could help avoid many of the legal and other problems that enforcement and foreign intelligence agencies now face with regard to sharing information and the coordination of foreign operations against traffickers. [] carefully pointed out that DEA is taking significant steps to improve its intelligence capability, and he hoped his previous remarks would be absorbed with this remedial action by DEA in mind.

3. Staff Position:

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: Briefing of Senator Nunn and Staff Members
of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations Page 4



b. The Subcommittee will want a continuing relationship with the Agency, such as receiving finished intelligence information and briefings, and possibly the publications produced by the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service.

c. As it turned out, the discussion centered much more on gun running and terrorism than it did on narcotics. [redacted] urged the Staff members to provide us with more specific questions in advance of future briefings in the interest of obtaining more efficient support from the Agency. The Staff members should also be encouraged to be more forthcoming about their own information if part of their purpose is to seek our help in authenticating or validating it.

SECRET



Attachments: A/S

cc: SA/DDCI
C/P&CS
C/P&CS/ITC
SA/DO/O
AGC/DDO
C/LAD

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000300020020-2

Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000300020020-2

SECRET


Recommendations to Resolve Problem Areas

1. The CIA, via its participation in CCINC Working Group meetings, has recommended that the Government review its strategies with regard to international narcotics control. The major recommendation is that our efforts abroad should aim at getting foreign governments to take the major burden in prosecuting or otherwise immobilizing traffickers, with only a limited part of this effort aimed at obtaining U.S. prosecutions. If this strategy were to be implemented, the coordination and cooperation of foreign intelligence and enforcement agencies could be worked out much more easily and without the many current problems relating to protecting sources and methods.

2. Related to the recommendation above, which in effect would make international narcotics control a foreign policy action program rather than part of a program to enforce U.S. laws, is another recommendation that would include the foreign intelligence components of DEA and Customs in the foreign intelligence community. This would better facilitate the coordination of foreign narcotics intelligence programs.

3. The enforcement agencies, DEA in particular, should consider assigning additional personnel, trained in the specialized skills of collecting, reporting and analyzing information, to increase the efficiency of their overseas intelligence efforts and related processing and dissemination of information.

4. That the DCI and the Administrator of DEA request the Department of Justice to act on DEA's request for clear guidelines as to its relationship with U.S. foreign intelligence agencies, the CIA and NSA in particular.



E 2 IMPDET
CL

SECRET